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Abstract: 
The entry price regime in the European Union (EU) applies to several products, 
mainly fresh fruits and vegetables. The complexity of the system with endogenous 
applied tariffs makes the evaluation of different alternatives of tariff cuts more 
challenging than for other regimes. The challenge applies to academics with interest on 
estimating market impacts, to WTO negotiators that need to evaluate proposals and to 
policy-makers that may need to take decisions on options such as the declaration of a 
sensitive product. This paper develops a methodology to compare different tariff cuts 
alternatives, including the URAA method that implies reductions in the level of the 
entry price, constant entry price, and Tariff Rate Quotas expansion. Uncertainty about 
international prices plays a central role on the estimated impacts on market access of 
different options. Reducing the level of entry prices can have relatively large impacts on 
market access for some products. The sensitive product treatment with TRQs may 
generate larger market access than the normal treatment. The proposed methodology 
proofs to be able to quantify the economic impacts of tariff cuts under EU entry price 
regime.     1
MEASURING DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF TARIFF CUTS  
UNDER EU ENTRY PRICE REGIME 
1. Introduction 
The European Common Market Organisation for the fruits and vegetables sector 
regulates trade with third countries using a combination of optional import licences, 
Common Customs Tariffs and an Entry Price Regime. The Entry Price Regime is 
applied to 4 vegetable products, 10 fruits and some grape processed products (see Table 
1). The rules for the application of the entry price for fruit and vegetables are laid down 
in Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 (OJ L 337, 24.12.1994), as last amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 386/2005 (OJ L 62, 9.3.2005). Basically, the ad valorem duty (AT) is the only 
duty applied when a product is imported with a price over the entry price (EP), while 
the Maximum Tariff Equivalent (MTE) is charged as an additional duty when the 
import price is under 92% of the EP. For the intermediate cases, small specific 
additional duties are charged covering the gap among the import price and the EP.  
Table 1: Products under the Entry Price Regime 
CN Code  Product  Ad Valorem (AT, %)  MTE (€/100kg) 
07020000 Tomato  8.8  /  14,4  29.8 
07070005  Cucumber  12.8 / 16  37.8 
07091000 Globe  artichokes  10.4  22.9 
07099070 Courgettes  12.8  15.2 
08051020  Sweet oranges, fresh  16  7.1 
080520  Mandarins & Clementines  16  10.6 
08055010 Lemons  6.4  25.6 
08061010  Table grapes  8 / 11.5 / 14.1  9.6 
080810  Apples  0 / 4 / 7.2  23.8 
080820  Pears  0 to 10.4  23.8 
08091000 Apricots  20  22.7 
080920  Cherries  6 / 12  27.4 
080930 Peaches  &  nectarines  17.6  13 
080940  Plums & sloes  6.4 / 12  10.3 
20096  Grape juice (Brix value < 30)  22.4 / 40  27 / 121 / 131
** 
220430  Other grape must  22.4 / 40  27 / 121 / 131
** 
Note: AV for most products varies among different periods of the year. In the same way, MTEs are not 
applied for several of these products in some periods of the year. AV and MTE for any product and 
specific date of the year can be obtained from Regulation  
*: AV and MTE depends on the Brix value of the juice. 
**:  €/hl   2
The Entry Price Regime constitutes a complex tariff system to be treated under 
the context of the WTO negotiations. Under the previous Uruguay Round Agricultural 
Agreement (URAA), tariff cuts for products under this regime consisted in a reduction 
of the AV and MTE according to general cuts agreed for agricultural tariffs and a 
decrease of the level of the EP of the same absolute amount than the MTE’s reduction. 
This is what we refer in this paper as the URAA method.  
Under current Doha Round negotiations, the issue of how to apply future agreed 
tariff cuts to products under the Entry Price Regime has not been discussed yet. A first 
objective of this paper is to develop a methodology to measure the impacts of the 
different options of tariff cuts that could be applied to these products. 
On the contrary, Doha Round agricultural negotiations have been largely 
devoted to the issue of “sensitive products”. All parts involved in the negotiations agree 
that members could designate some of their products (defined by their tariff lines) as 
“sensitive product”. This declaration would lead to smaller tariff cuts but a creation or 
increase of Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs). However, large differences exist among the 
delegations’ proposals for sensitive products in relation with the number of tariff lines 
that could be declared sensitive, the proportion of reduction of tariff cuts and the level 
of the expansion of TRQs. These differences can be observed in the document 
corresponding to the daft proposal for modalities on agriculture discussed but not 
agreed in Geneva on July 2006 (WTO, 2006).  
The European Commission made its own proposal for the treatment of sensitive 
products under its October 2005 offer on the Doha World Trade talks (EC, 2005). The 
proposal included the designation of up to 8% of total tariff lines as sensitive products 
and reduced of tariff cuts of one third to two thirds of the corresponding non-sensitive 
tariff cut. The increase in TRQ, expressed as a percentage of current imports of the tariff   3
lines in question, would result from the division of the tariff cut deviation, expressed in 
percentage points, by the effective border protection
1, adjusting the result by a 
coefficient of 0.8. Under this context, the second objective of this paper is to evaluate 
how effective is the EC proposal for sensitive products in the case of products under the 
Entry Price Regime. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the economics 
of the Entry Price Regime while section 3 describes the methodology developed to 
address the issue of tariff cuts for products with entry price in a context of uncertain 
import prices. Section 4 presents the results of the use of this methodology to measure 
potential impacts of tariff cuts options with some examples. Section 5 assesses the EC 
proposal for sensitive products and TRQs expansions under the EP regime using the 
methodology explained in section 3 plus an extension exposed in Annex 1. Finally, 
section 6 provides main conclusions from our research. 
2. The Economics of the Entry Price Regime 
The entry price system is defined by the level of entry price (EP) and the level of 
the Maximum Tariff Equivalent (MTE) which is triggered when the price of imports 
(IP) falls below 92% of the entry price. The MTE is the specific tariff (ST) to be paid on 
the top of the ad valorem tariff (AT) which is paid by all imports regardless their import 
price. In between 100% and 92% of the entry price, there are four equal intervals with 
increasing specific tariff that cover the difference between the import price and the entry 
price. The system is represented in Figure 1 with a kinked tariff profile (cucumbers 
from 1 March to 30 April are used as an example). If some trade occurs, domestic prices 
should equal the sum of the import price plus the ad valorem and the specific tariff.   
                                                 
1 Tariff cut deviation / (1+AVE), with AVE=Ad Valorem Equivalent tariff according to an agreed WTO 
method of calculation.   4











































































































































It could be thought that the specific tariff attached to this entry price regime does 
not provide protection when the import price is above the entry price (EP) in the right-
hand side of the vertical line in Figure 1. But in a world with price uncertainty this is not 
true. International prices and import prices are uncertain and would be better 
represented by a random distribution at any given time. In this context production 
decisions will not be taken on the basis of ex post observed domestic prices (DP), but on 
ex ante expected prices. Thus, cuts in the EP or in the MTE of the entry price regime 
can potentially generate changes in the distribution of IP and in the corresponding 
distribution of applied tariffs and expected domestic prices. The parameters of the entry 
price regime can influence domestic prices even when no specific tariff is applied due to 
high import prices. 
How do tariff cuts affect the regime? Figure 2 represents some of the three types 
of effects associated with tariff cuts under an entry price regime. First, a reduction in the 
tariff levels MTE or AT directly affects the tariff paid at each price, and therefore the 
corresponding expected price, even if the MTE is not effectively paid. A reduction of 
the rates of MTE and AT directly reduces the price gap that can be maintained between 
domestic and import prices (downwards movement in Figure 2). This happens to 
different extents at any potential import price.    5






















































































Second, the level of the entry price modifies the range of prices that would have 
to pay the specific tariff: a reduction in the EP reduces the expected tariff and has an 
impact on the expected domestic price even if, at the end of the day, no specific tariff is 
paid. This is represented in Figure 2 by a leftwards movement of the vertical kink at EP.  
Third, a change in the level of the entry price may have a direct influence on the 
prices of imports arriving to the border, whose distributions would normally move in 
the same direction: exporters from other countries may adjust their prices to the level of 
EP in order to avoid or reduce the tariff paid
2. This effect is harder to represent in the 
graph, but it would imply a leftward movement of the mass of the distribution of prices 
when EP is cut. 
The entry price regime would be made a bit more complex if in addition a Tariff 
Rate Quota (TRQ) would be working with further reduced tariff rates as foreseen in 
some WTO negotiation proposals for sensitive products. These additional imports 
would put further downwards pressure on domestic prices. In this context, Price 
response would depend on the import demand elasticity. Section 5 will try to quantify 
                                                 
2 This effect is consistent with the results of Chemnitz and Grethe (2005) about the existence of an 
economic rent in the side of Moroccan exporters of tomatoes to the EU. However in this case (and in 
some others) preferences to third countries make more complex the economic analysis of MFN tariff 
reductions (see Garcia Alvarez-Coque et al. 2006 addressing this issue). Also in relation with this effect, 
Berbel (1987) describes how the regime favours exporters to organise their trade flows in order to avoid 
maximum tariffs.    6
impacts of TRQs expansions for sensitive products in comparison with normal cuts for 
non-sensitive products.   
3. From tariff cuts and TRQs to domestic price reductions: A methodology under 
international price uncertainty 
In this section we develop a simple methodology in order to measure how tariff 
cut proposals would be transmitted into domestic price reductions. The first step is 
building a distribution of import prices using available information. The best 
information available in the EU for this purpose is the SIV (Standard Import Values) 
daily prices. The daily mean and variance of SIV prices in the corresponding months 
during the last two years are calculated. These are used as the mean and variance of the 
corresponding import prices. It is then assumed that prices are distributed normally: 
]) [ ], [ ( VGI V VGI E N IP ∝  
The second step consists on calculating the impact of the entry price on the 
expected domestic price by adding up the calculated expected import price and the 
expected total duty. Entry prices are assumed to generate a truncation on the normal 
distribution of import prices so that imports tend to arrive at prices above entry prices. 
The new distribution will have a higher mean and a lower variance. These new values of 
mean and variance of import prices are calculated using the methodology developed by 
Chavas and Holt (1990). From the import price distribution, probabilities of prices 
being in given intervals are calculated and, using the specific tariff regime formula, the 
corresponding expected total specific tariff is also calculated. Ad valorem tariff is 
converted into a specific equivalent by multiplying ad valorem rate by expected import 
price. Finally expected domestic price E[DP] is calculated by adding up the augmented 
mean of import prices, the expected total specific tariff and the specific equivalent of 
the ad valorem tariff.    7
The third step repeats the procedure in step two after a tariff cut is applied, and a 
new expected domestic price is obtained. New entry prices (if assumed to be cut) 
generate a new truncation on the distribution of import prices. So a lower expected 
import price is calculated. From the import price distribution, the corresponding new 
expected total specific tariff is also calculated. Ad valorem tariff is converted into a 
specific equivalent by multiplying ad valorem rate by expected import price. The new 
expected domestic price E[DPn] is the sum of the new expected import price, and the 
expected new total specific tariff and the specific equivalent of the ad valorem tariff. 
We define the price reduction as:  
] [










An additional fourth step is proposed whenever we add a TRQ on the top of the 
entry price regime if the product is declared as sensitive. This step allows for comparing 
tariff cuts with quota expansions. This comparison requires the use of an elasticity for 
the demand of imports “ε”. We can then calculate the expansion of market access 
(percentage change in imports) as a function of this elasticity: 
n n dp m * ε = ; 
And we can compare it with the quota expansion under other tariff cut to be 
considered, for instance, for sensitive products: 
s s dp m * ε =  
Then we can compare the expansion of imports under sensitive product regime 
(lower tariff cuts plus a TRQ) with the expansion of imports under the normal regime of 
only tariff cuts: 
s n
TRQ
s n TRQ n s TRQ dp dp
m
dp dp m m m m
−
> ⇔ − < ⇔ < + ε ε ε * *   8






= ε ˆ  . We use 
import data taken from Data ComExt for this purpose. If import demand has an 
elasticity larger than this ε ˆ, then the product would obtain smaller market access under 
the sensitive formula as compared to the normal formula. If there is lack of knowledge 
about the magnitude of the import demand elasticity for all products, this threshold 
elasticity can be used as an indicator to rank products according to their degree of 
effectiveness of the sensitive product option: lower value of the threshold elasticity 
implies larger probability of reducing market access by declaring the product as 
sensitive. 
4. Protection impacts of tariff cuts under entry price regime  
For the time being WTO negotiations have not enter into discussing how the 
potentially agreed tariff cuts would be applied in the case of the entry price regime. We 
consider here two obvious alternatives. In both cases we suppose that cuts will be 
applied to both the MTE and in the ad valorem duty: 
•  Option 1: Additionally the entry price EP will be cut by an amount equal to 
MTE cut. This is Uruguay Round (URAA) method.  
•  Option 2: Cut in the MTE and in the ad valorem duty with no change in entry 
price. 
Does it make a big difference in protection the reduction or not of entry prices? 
To answer this question we will use the methodology developed in section 3 to quantify 
these differences in some examples. Previous Figure 2 shows the shape of the EU tariff 
protection for cucumbers in March / April before any cut (initial) and after a 50% cut 
(according to EC October 2005 proposal in WTO negotiations with an initial ad   9
valorem  equivalent or AVE of 76%) with the reduction of entry prices (URAA method) 
and without it (EP kept constant).  
Let us consider first what we have named Option 1, thus reducing EP from EP0 
to EP1. Since there is uncertainty about the price of imports (IP), three different cases 
can be distinguished. In case 1, the import price IP is above 92% of the entry price EP0, 
and the tariff cut effectively applies only to the ad valorem component AT (and the 
reduced ST). On the contrary, in case 3, the IP is below 92% of the new entry price EP1 
and both tariffs (MTE and AT) would be effectively reduced by 50%.  
But, what does it happen in the intermediate situations of the case 2? Here, the 
import price is in-between 92% of PE0 and PE1, and there will be an effective 50% 
reduction in the ad valorem tariff and an effective elimination of the MTE. In this case 
the effective reduction in duties can be much larger than the nominal 50% under the 
proposal. In general, this will be the case when calculating the expected tariff: the cut in 
expected tariff will be larger than the agreed tariff cut (see Table 2 for some examples 
of calculations of these cuts). Under the second option of not reducing the EP, case 2 
vanishes and there is not a reduction in expected tariffs beyond the percentage cut 
calculated under the agreed formula. 
Table 2: Effective versus nominal tariff cuts for products with Entry Price 
when import prices are in the case 2 situation (in-between 92% of PE0 and PE1) 
Product  AVE (Band)  Nominal (agreed) cut  Effective cut 
Tomato 48,2%  (II)  45%  90% 
Cucumber 75,9%  (III)  50%  92% 
Lemon 46,4%  (II)  45%  92% 
 
Differences among both options of tariff cuts can be illustrated with our example 
for cucumbers. The nominal reduction in total duties can vary from 7€/100kg for high 
import prices under case 1 (about 5% of domestic price) to 45€/100kg for lower import 
prices under case 2 (about 35% of domestic price). If entry prices were not cut, the 
maximum nominal cut could be 26 €/100kg (about 20% of domestic price) for low   10
prices under case 3. These numbers already show that the difference between the two 
options can potentially be large. 
 
Table 3 calculates expected impact on duties and domestic prices under the two 
options of treatment of entry prices. For instance, for lemons in June-October, under the 
first option URAA (see first column of data in Table 3), the expected duty is estimated 
to be reduced by the 68% applying the normal formula, well above the 45% reduction 
obtained from the formula in EC proposal. This is due to the fact that sometime prices 
are below entry prices and pay the specific tariff. If lemons were declared sensitive, the 
expected cut would be 38%, much larger than the 15% under the EC proposal reduction 
formula. On the contrary, if entry prices are not reduced (second column of data in 
Table 3), the expected duties are reduced by the same percentage that is derived from 
the formula: 45% or 15% if declared sensitive. Domestic prices are expected to fall by 
8.3% in option 1 as compared to 4.5% in option 2 (if it is not declared as sensitive). 
Table 3 also shows two other examples
3. The expected cut on tariffs for 
tomatoes in October-May is 66% under option 1 (URAA) as compared to 45% in option 
                                                 
3 The numerical results are sensitive to the distribution of import prices SIV. For instance, Goetz and 
Grethe (2006) present orange VIS prices that are much higher than entry prices and, therefore, have only 
a marginal impact on market access. 
TABLE 3: Expected duties under alternative hypotheses:Cuts in Entry Prices (URAA) versus Constant Entry Prices 





∇EP=  ∇MTE 
(URAA)  EP=cte
INITIAL Expeted Import Price VGI  59,2 59,2 66,4 66,4 87,7 87,7
Entry Price 53,5 53,5 46,1 46,1 44,9 44,9
Expected total duty  6,6 6,6 3,0 3,0 5,9 5,9
NORMAL CUT  Cut in Expected total duty  4,5 3,0 2,0 1,4 4,5 3,0
% cut in expected duty 68% 45% 66% 45% 75%  50%
% cut according to formula 45% 45% 45% 45% 50%  50%
Cut in Expected Import Price  1,0 0,0 1,3 0,0 2,4 0,0
Total cut as % of DP 8,3% 4,5% 4,8% 2,0% 7,3% 3,2%
SENSITIVE CUT Cut in Expected total duty  2,5 1,0 0,8 0,5 2,0 1,0
% cut in expected duty 38% 15% 27% 15% 33%  17%
% cut according to formula 15% 15% 15% 15% 17%  17%
Cut in Expected Import Price  0,7 0,0 0,5 0,0 1,0 0,0
Total cut as % of DP 4,8% 1,5% 1,9% 0,7% 3,2% 1,1%
TRQ Expansion % (Formula)  16,4% 16,4% 16,3% 16,3% 15,2% 15,2%
TRQ Expansion (1000 tons) 21,0 21,0 34,3 34,3 1,4 1,4
THRESHOLD ELASTICITY  2,7 3,2 4,7 10,3 2,9 5,7  11
2 (if normal) and 27% vs 15% (if sensitive). For cucumber November-May the expected 
cut on duties is 75% under option 1 (URAA) as compared to 50% in option 2 (if 
normal) and 33% vs 17% (if sensitive). These three examples show that reducing the EP 
by the same amount that the MTE (URAA method) can generate much larger reductions 
in expected duties than maintaining the entry price constant at current levels. 
5. Sensitive product treatment: TRQ expansions 
It is foreseen that under a potential WTO agreement the products declared as 
sensitive would be allowed for lower tariff cuts while opening new or additional TRQs 
to ensure some additional market access (WTO 2006). The design of this combination 
of lower tariff cuts plus the TRQ should permit some additional market access even for 
the products declared as sensitive. But does it imply smaller expansion of market access 
than under the formula for normal products? The methodology developed in section 3 
allows to proof that the WTO proposal from the European Commission does not always 
guarantee lower market access under sensitive product treatment. Only under high 
enough demand elasticity and high enough initial tariffs (in terms of AVEs) sensitive 
product treatment generates lower market access (see Annex 1).  
In the case of uncertain prices and products under entry price regime, effective 
expected prices and tariffs do not necessarily coincide with calculated AVEs. Then, the 
question becomes a bit more complex than in the case developed Annex 1 and it 
requires further numerical calculations as developed in section 3. Real data from last 
campaigns allows replacing calculated AVEs by expected tariffs to calculate the 
threshold elasticity that equals imports expansion under both treatments –normal and 
sensitive. This threshold elasticity becomes also an indicator for the degree of 
effectiveness of the “sensitive treatment” for each product, in terms of reducing market 
access as compared to the normal treatment.   12
 
Table 4 shows how the threshold elasticity for three different periods of 
production of lemons is estimated to be 4 in November/April, 5.3 in May, 2.7 in June-
October and 3.1 for the whole year. Of course these elasticities should be compared 
with empirically estimated values. But these relatively high elasticities already raise the 
question if the proposed EC formula for TRQ expansion under sensitive product may 
generate more market access than just applying the normal formula. This may make the 
option of declaring lemons as sensitive product not very attractive for the EC, even if 
this is a sector with increasing imports and declining domestic prices in the EU.  
The last column in Table 4 replicates the calculations for the period June-
October under the hypothesis of 20% lower import prices and 20% higher standard 
deviation. In this case the threshold elasticity would be equal to 0.6, a much lower level 
that would make the sensitive product option more likely to generate less market access 
opportunities than under normal product. Lemon import prices are unlikely to be so low, 
but this “hypothesis approach” can be used as a complementary indicator to measure the 
degree of effectiveness of the “sensitive treatment” for each product. Threshold 
elasticities are also calculated in Table 3 (third block of rows) for tomatoes and 
TABLE 4: Sensitive treatment and the entry price of Lemons (€/100 kg)
Nov-Abril Mayo Jun_oct YEAR 
Hypothesis 
June-Oct.
INITIAL Expeted Import Price VGI 58,5 60,2 59,2 54,4
Entry Price 46,2 42,2 53,5 53,5
Expected total duty 4,8 3,9 6,6 20,0
NORMAL CUT  Cut in Expected total duty 2,7 1,8 4,5
% cut in expected duty 56% 45% 68%
% cut according to formula 45% 45% 45% 15,6
Cut in Expected Import Price 0,3 0,0 1,0 6,4
Total cut as % of DP 4,7% 2,8% 8,3% 7,1% 29,5%
SENSITIVE CUT Cut in Expected total duty 1,2 0,6 2,5
% cut in expected duty 26% 15% 38%
% cut according to formula 15% 15% 15% 6,6
Cut in Expected Import Price 0,2 0,0 0,7 2,8
Total cut as % of DP 2,3% 0,9% 4,8% 3,9% 12,7%
TRQ Expansion % (Formula) 16,4% 16,4% 16,4% 16,4% 16,4%
TRQ Expansion (1000 tons) 6,6 2,5 21,0 30,0 21,0
THRESHOLD ELASTICITY 4,0 5,3 2,7 3,1 0,6  13
cucumbers, and they are systematically higher under the constant entry price method as 
compared to URAA.  
6. Some conclusions 
There are several open issues related with the application to entry price regimes 
of potential agreements to cut agricultural tariffs in the frame of WTO negotiations. 
Two main questions relate with the reduction or not of the entry price with the MTE, 
and the economic value of the EC proposal on sensitive products and TRQ expansion. 
These need to be analysed in an uncertainty price framework using available empirical 
information about border prices. This paper has developed a simple methodology to 
proceed in this direction in order to be able to quantify the economic meaning of 
different proposals in terms of their impact of market access.  
According to our results, the URAA method of reducing entry prices with the 
Maximum Tariff Equivalent (MTE) would imply effective cuts in expected duties that 
go far beyond the nominal cuts in the agreed formula. The additional market access due 
to this provision could be very large whenever import prices are very near the entry 
prices.  
The EC proposal for TRQ expansion for sensitive products can potentially 
generate market access that goes beyond the access generated by normal formula for 
non-sensitive products. This underlines that there is scope to exploit the trade-off 
between the number of sensitive lines that could be declared and the treatment that they 
will receive. 
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Annex 1: A technical review of the EU proposal on TRQ expansion formula 
This annex develops a simple model to understand the relative implications of sensitive 
versus normal product treatment under the EC proposal. Let us define the following 
variables: 
AVE=Ad Valorem Equivalent tariff in per unit terms (if 45%, then 0.45) 
mn=∆Mn/M= Per unit change in imports under normal formula 
ms=∆Ms/M= Per unit change in imports under sensitive product formula 
mTRQ= ∆TRQs/M= Per unit of imports expansion in TRQ for sensitive products 
aven= ∇AVEn/AVE=Per unit reduction in AVE under normal formula 
aves= ∇AVEs/AVE=Per unit reduction in AVE under sensitive product formula 
ε=Elasticity of excess demand for imports   15
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Therefore the TRQ expansion will be smaller than the different in imports expansion 
under normal versus sensitive treatment only if elasticity and AVE are large enough: 
AVE
AVE m m m s n TRQ
8 . 0
* 8 . 0 > ⇔ < ⇔ − < ε ε  
Therefore, the formula does not guarantee lower market access under sensitive product 
treatment. Only if the elasticity of import demand is above a threshold (0.8/AVE), 
declaration of sensitivity will imply lower market access. 
 
 